United States: LNG at the heart of trade negotiations?

U.S. natural gas: a high-speed ramp-up

A "boom" in exports, supported by the energy crisis

U.S. gas exports have grown exponentially over the past decade, and currently account for 15 percent of the country's total production. Less than $5 billion until the beginning of the 2010s, they totalled more than $35 billion in February 2025 over one year. Beyond the price effect, export volumes have also multiplied in recent years.

The trajectory of exports coincides with that observed on American production. While it should be noted that the United States was already exporting gas from Alaska to Japan in the early 1970s, or via pipelines to Canada and Mexico, the development of real LNG export capacity only began in February 2016 with the development of port infrastructure.

Since then, export volumes have continued to increase year after year, almost independently of gas prices. This steady growth can be explained by the significant costs associated with infrastructure development (between $10 billion and $20 billion per liquefaction terminal), which push investors to secure contracts that generally represent 80% of the site's capacity upstream. These infrastructure projects are therefore necessarily spread over several years, which makes them less sensitive to price fluctuations. And while restrictions had been implemented by the Biden administration (partly explaining the stagnation in 2024), they have since been abolished by his successor.

However, while the overall trajectory of LNG export volumes has remained relatively linear, their geographical distribution has undergone significant changes in recent years. Historically, Asia mainly and Latin America to a lesser extent have been the main markets for American LNG. In 2018, Asian countries accounted for more than half (52%) of the total volumes exported by the United States. But this share then fell considerably, due to lower demand from Asian countries (China in particular) but above all to the spectacular surge in exports to Europe following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Between 2021 and 2022, the volume of European imports increased almost 2.5 times and its share of US LNG exports increased from 29% to 64%. But while the energy crisis quickly propelled European countries to the top of the list of US LNG buyers, their imports decreased slightly in 2024. Demand from Europe is also expected to continue to gradually decline in line with the implementation of climate policies, and the movement could accelerate in the event of a resolution of the conflict and the easing of sanctions against Russia.

Beyond Europe, the outlook for global demand remains subdued, posing a risk of overcapacity given the sharp increase in supply (particularly from the United States) that will take place in parallel. We must therefore expect increased competition between the major producing countries.

A central place in current trade negotiations

Faced with the programmed reduction in demand, the United States must therefore find new outlets, especially as its production and export capacities continue to grow strongly. With this in mind, they are naturally turning to Asia, both a historical partner and the main driver of global gas demand in the coming years.

Beyond the trajectory of demand, the United States' stated objective is to increase its market share in many countries. And the US administration seems to have room for manoeuvre: US LNG imports represent only a relatively small share, between 10 and 20%, of imports from the main Asian countries. Respectively, this proportion exceeded 60% in 2023 for many European countries.

It is therefore not surprising to observe that LNG issues occupy a prominent place in the current trade negotiations between Asian countries and the Trump administration. Even before the announcement of the "reciprocal" tariffs by the Trump administration, many countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Philippines, etc.) had already expressed their desire to increase their imports, hoping to obtain preferential treatment.

Despite the announcement of a 90-day "pause", the continuation of negotiations is therefore an opportunity for the United States to fill its order book for the coming years and to confirm its new dominant position on the global LNG market.

As an example, Taiwanese operators recently announced a plan to significantly strengthen their US gas supplies over the next few years. The United States' share of the island's LNG imports could thus triple, from the current 10% to 30% within 10 years. But the US administration's expectations do not seem to be limited to export volumes.

Indeed, Donald Trump has clearly called on his international partners (and in particular Japan and South Korea) to invest in "Alaska LNG". Pre-approved under President Joe Biden, this megaproject, both environmentally and economically controversial, aims to exploit the resources of Alaska's far north and allow them to be exported through the construction of a nearly 1500-kilometre-long pipeline. This project is by far the largest ever envisaged: the total investment is estimated at $44 billion (between 3 and 4 times the annual budget of the State of Alaska) and it took 5 years and more than $100 million in research budget to obtain a green light from the authorities. In the long term, it could allow the operation of 3.5 bcf/day, a substantial increase compared to the current capacity, mainly intended for export to Asia.

However, the project has attracted very limited interest given the very high risks surrounding its feasibility and economic profitability, despite the calls of the American president. Moreover, as in the case of Europe, American ambitions here clash with the climate ambitions of countries such as Japan and South Korea. However, the US administration could certainly take advantage of the current negotiations to unblock the situation, as suggested by the scheduled visits to Alaska by Korean and Thai delegations, or the announcement of a summit organised on 2 June in Alaska.

In summary